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Abstract 
Rural mini-grids are viewed as a key technology for providing access to electricity to 
the billion or more people that lack it by 2030 (in line with the UN’s Sustainable 
Energy for All commitment). But at present no model for the sustainable management 
of rural mini-grids exists, which contributes to high failure rates. This paper makes a 
number of contributions. First, it explores how electricity in mini-grids might be 
understood as a Common Pool Resource (CPR), opening up potential to learn from 
the extensive literature on institutional characteristics of sustainable CPR 
management in the natural resource management literature. Second, it refines 
Agrawal’s (2001) overarching framework of enabling conditions for sustainable CPR 
management institutions to develop a framework applicable to rural mini-grid 
management in developing countries. Thirdly, the utility of this refined framework is 
demonstrated by applying it to analyse data from 27 semi-structured interviews with 
actors with expertise in mini-grid development and management in Kenya and 2 field 
visits to rural mini-grids there. This contributes a nuanced basis for future application 
of CPR theory to mini-grids and a systematic analysis of institutional challenges and 
possible solutions, which have hitherto received limited attention in the energy and 
development literature. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Over one billion people lack access to electricity – a vital precursor of many aspects 
of human and economic development [1]. In sub-Saharan Africa around two in every 
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three people lack access, with electrification rates below 25% in some countries [2]. 
The UN’s “Sustainable Energy for All” (SE4ALL) initiative (supported by 
Sustainable Development Goal 7) aims to solve this problem by 2030. But this aim is 
plagued by problems in practice. In this paper, we focus on developing sustainable 
institutions for managing the use of a key technology, mini-grids, which are estimated 
as needing to provide 45% of the connections required to achieve SE4ALL by 2030, 
the majority in remote rural locations [3]. 
 
Despite their promise, managing mini-grids in ways that can provide electricity access 
to poor people poses considerable technical, economic, socio-cultural and political 
challenges, with failure rates evaluated as being high as 50-100% [4, 5]. Part of the 
reason for this failure can be due to inappropriate equipment installation and/or 
inadequate maintenance; it can also relate to financial issues (e.g. tariffs being set too 
low). A persistent problem also, however, relates to collective over consumption of 
electricity, which in turn leads to equipment degradation and failure, indicating the 
presence of socio-cultural and institutional management dimensions to mini-grid 
failure (explored in more detail in Section 5) as much as technical or financial reasons 
[4, 5]. Whilst, as Section 2 demonstrates, the engineering and economic challenges 
relating to energy access in developing countries are relatively well researched, the 
socio-cultural and political challenges have received very little attention to date1. In 
this paper, we focus on the institutional aspects of managing mini-grids, which cut 
across all of the above challenges, but in particular cast analytic attention on the 
socio-cultural and political dimensions of energy access. We demonstrate how 
insights from the broad literature on common pool resource (CPR) management 
(which mostly focuses on natural resources) can shed light on how to sustainably 
manage a man-made resource, electricity in mini-grids. There are examples of 
scholars who have proposed that mini-grids are CPRs [4-7]. As demonstrated in 
Section 2, however, there is, to date, no systematic examination of the relevance, and 
applicability to mini-grids, of the well-developed literature (reviewed below) on the 
                                                 
1 Note, it is not our intention to imply that high mini-grid failure rates are purely the 
result of a lack of sustainable management models and that technical and financial 
problems do not also contribute to failure, rather we wish to explore the former in a 
research field previously dominated by a focus on the latter. 
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‘enabling conditions’ under which institutions will emerge that support sustainable 
management of CPRs. 
 
Our core question is whether CPR theory can assist in analysing the enabling 
conditions that characterise institutions capable of sustainably managing mini-grids 
for pro-poor electricity access in developing countries. After reviewing relevant 
literature on energy and development and useful strands of the CPR literature, the 
paper makes its first contribution by analysing the conditions under which mini-grids 
display the characteristics of CPRs and hence how CPR theory might be relevant. We 
highlight similarities between electricity in a mini-grid and water in irrigation systems 
(the subject of a large part of the CPR literature) using the hydraulic analogy to 
explain the behaviour of electricity in closed circuits. The paper then makes its second 
contribution by developing a refined, mini-grid specific, analytical framework of 
enabling conditions for the sustainable management of CPRs (based on Agrawal [8]). 
The potential utility of this refined framework is then tested by applying it to analyse 
empirical data from 27 expert interviews and 2 site visits to mini-grids in rural Kenya. 
This provides a nuanced basis for future research. Our intention is not to produce 
overarching prescriptions for solving the complex problems that relate to managing 
rural mini-grids in developing countries. Rather, it is to develop and evaluate the 
usefulness of a new analytic, theoretically grounded approach with potential to inform 
future research and practice focussed on overcoming the high levels of failure 
observed in relation to rural mini-grids in developing countries. 
 
 
2. Relevance of CPR theory for mini-grids 
This paper engages with the CPR management literature made famous by Hardin’s 
[9] “Tragedy of the Commons” and Ostrom’s [10] later Nobel prize winning work, 
which demonstrated how social institutions can form and achieve sustainable 
management of CPRs, thus avoiding Hardin’s earlier hypothesized “tragedy”. We 
apply Ostrom’s and later authors’ insights on sustainable CPR management to local 
electricity provision in the form of mini-grids. This is motivated by recognition of the 
sophisticated body of theoretical and empirical work in the CPR and collective action 
field, compared to a lack of any well-developed institutional approaches within the 
energy access literature. Rather than starting from scratch, we want to see what we 
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can learn from this work that, arguably, deals with systems similar to decentralized, 
collective electricity provision via mini-grids.  
 
The existing energy access literature has, to date, been dominated by a focus on the 
financial and technological  dimensions, with attendant disciplinary domination by 
economics and engineering, with insufficient focus on socio-cultural and political 
dimensions [11] – what Ockwell and Byrne [12] describe as the “scholarly deficit” in 
energy access research. 
 
As a result, we know a lot about financial dimensions of mini-grids and rural 
electrification more broadly, such as: relative costs and benefits of technological 
options [e.g. 13, 14]; willingness and ability to pay [e.g. 15]; and the nature and 
appropriateness of different financing mechanisms for infrastructure [e.g. 16]. We 
also know much about: technology selection methods [e.g. 17]; applicability of 
technologies to specific physical contexts [e.g. 18, 19]; spatial mapping of 
technological applicability and least-cost scenarios [e.g. 20]; improving technological 
efficiency [e.g. 21]; technology adoption, e.g. the energy ladder [e.g. 22]; and 
scenario modeling [e.g. 23]. 
 
A handful of recent contributions have begun to grapple with political economy 
dimensions of energy access more broadly (as opposed to mini-grids specifically) 
[e.g. 24, 25-31]. And recent years have witnessed what might be described as a 
nascent “socio-cultural turn” [12] in energy access research, with a number of 
contributions operationalizing insights from the socio-technical transitions literature 
[32-39] and social anthropology [40-42]. These contributions have cast analytic light 
on a range of socio-cultural aspects of energy access, including understanding the 
social, cultural, gendered and, inevitably, political dimensions of electrification and 
the implications of involving potential users in the design, development and 
implementation of rural electrification projects. A number of recent contributions also 
operationalize insights from innovation studies, introducing an emphasis on 
indigenous capability building, albeit more at a firm/industry than community level 
[43-47]. There have also been recent attempts to bridge the fields of socio-technical 
transitions and innovation studies [see 12, 48]. More explicitly focussed on 
sustainable mini-grid management, a wider literature also exists (mostly focusing on 
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Indian experiences) which analyses enabling conditions for sustainable management 
of mini-grids, emphasizing, for example, the important role that village energy 
committees and other local institutions have played, as well as the broader importance 
of community participation [e.g. 49, 50, 51]. 
 
Despite this recent socio-cultural turn and the emerging literature on the politics of 
energy access, however, only four pieces of grey literature to date (two working 
papers and two doctoral theses, no peer reviewed journal articles) have explicitly 
engaged with institutional insights from the collective action literature [4, 5, 7, 52]. Of 
these, only three recognize the relevance of work in that literature on understanding 
enabling conditions for sustainable CPR management and all three of these 
demonstrate only a partial engagement with this work. Maier [5] uses a CPR 
perspective to analyse reasons for successes and failures of 27 community-based 
micro hydro mini-grids in Northern Pakistan. He finds that communities have 
established institutions and various rules of use, concluding that they are able to 
govern the use and ensure the maintenance of the plants in ways that often function 
better than state- or private-based models. In most cases, the projects that failed 
experienced external pressures, e.g. the arrival of the national grid. Maier does not 
venture beyond treating electricity as a CPR, identifying CPR attributes and 
describing resulting management challenges. There is no systematic application of 
theories of collective action or reference to overarching enabling conditions through 
which institutions and transferable approaches may be developed, although, given the 
importance of rules Maier identifies, the use of enabling conditions as an analytical 
tool would have been appropriate. 
 
Greacen [4] also suggests that electricity in community-based micro hydro mini-grids, 
in this case 59 projects in Thailand, can be treated as a CPR. Rather than elaborating 
on the manner in which experiences from other instances of collective action could be 
used to overcome identified challenges, however, he suggests a technological fix that 
could be used to address the problems: current limiters, which technically limit the 
maximum current that can be drawn by each household. Again, there is no attempt at 
a theoretical expansion of the collective action literature. Furthermore, this focus on 
technical fixes ignores potential institutional considerations that might still persist, 
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e.g. managing distribution among users during seasonal demand that exceeds 
generating capacity. 
 
In an analysis of the economic impacts of 5 community-based micro hydro mini-grids 
in rural Kenya, Kirubi [7] also studies some aspects of collective action. He focuses 
on the contested effect of heterogeneity of user groups on the sustainability of 
collective action and finds that heterogeneity of resource users increases chances of 
long-term success. This analysis only represents one small sub-section of a thesis 
more broadly concerned with the impact of electricity access on rural development 
and only engages with one of the 33 enabling conditions identified in Agrawal’s [8] 
theoretical framework that we refine and test further below. There is therefore no 
precedent in the peer-reviewed or grey literature for applying a comprehensive 
theoretical framework of enabling conditions for collective action to the issue of 
sustainably managing mini-grids for pro-poor rural electrification.  
 
2.1 Conceptualizing mini-grids as CPRs 
A CPR is defined as being rivalrous (or exhibiting high subtractability), meaning that 
a resource unit consumed by one resource user can no longer be used by another and 
exclusion from access to the resource is difficult [53]. This is in contrast to public 
goods, for example, which are non-rivalrous (e.g. street lighting). These 
characteristics of a CPR create a number of potential challenges: ‘Thus common-pool 
resources are subject to the problems of congestion, overuse, pollution, and potential 
destruction unless harvesting or use limits are devised and enforced.’ [53, p.120]. It is 
important to note that a CPR does not imply open access to all — exclusion is 
difficult but not impossible. Rather, a CPR may still be associated with a variety of 
property rights regimes [54]. The argument has been made that energy infrastructure 
exhibits CPR characteristics [55]. To our knowledge, however, only Gollwitzer [56], 
Gollwitzer, Ockwell and Ely [57] and Wolsink [6] have discussed in depth the 
relevance of CPR theory for micro-grids (the latter in the context of emerging, future 
‘smart-grids’ in developed economies – see also [58]). The functioning and 
characteristics of (micro and) mini-grids in poor rural communities in developing 
countries differ significantly, hence, the lessons to be taken from the CPR literature 
may differ in significant ways. 
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Irrigation systems are considered typical examples of CPRs and, to structure our 
analysis, we work with the so-called “hydraulic analogy” to identify similarities and 
differences between irrigation systems and electric mini-grids. The analogy is 
between a system of water pipes and a closed electric circuit (water flowing through 
pipes being analogous to electrons flowing through a conductor - resistance in the 
electric circuit is analogous to friction in the pipes, voltage equates with pressure and 
current with volume flow). An independent mini-grid can be seen to share a number 
of characteristics with an irrigation system, e.g. the consumption limit imposed by the 
recharge rate. This leads to a number of similar operational management challenges. 
Water in an irrigation system is a rivalrous resource: if an upstream farmer uses all the 
water in the irrigation canal there is no water left for the remaining farmers further 
downstream. Mini-grids are rivalrous in the sense that there is a limited generation 
capacity that must be balanced with demand. Both generation capacity and demand 
typically vary over the day and over seasons, leading to periods of both scarcity and 
underuse. User access is typically controlled in the sense that the operators can decide 
the number of connections to the local grid, but there can be problems with illegal 
connections, and, once connected, users may under certain circumstances use more 
than their agreed share. If one electricity user continues to add powerful loads she will 
eventually overload the system resulting in voltage drops and potentially causing a 
black out. In both irrigation systems and mini-grids, action by one person may lead to 
reduced performance and potentially damage to the system (e.g. droughts or 
blackouts) affecting all users. It is important to emphasise, however, that, unlike 
water, electricity cannot be stored, or can be stored at very high cost, which means 
that generation and consumption often need to be more coordinated. This can also 
have implications in terms of the size of systems and their efficiency, with larger 
systems potentially seeming more efficient than smaller systems due to the possibility 
of economies of scale and better management of demand variability (such a 
perspective, however, often ignores the inefficiencies of transmission, especially over 
large distances to remote rural areas where mini-grids have most promise; it also 
ignores non-financial costs [e.g. environmental and social impacts], or ‘externalities’, 
associated with centralized, grid based electricity production and transmission). 
 
There are further differences between irrigation systems and mini-grids, including 
important technical and economic considerations. In irrigation systems, the CPR 
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(water) has no cost of generation (disregarding small potential costs for pumping), 
users do not commonly pay per unit and access is often hard to control. Electricity is 
not rivalrous in precisely the same sense (although there is a limit to simultaneous 
consumption) as the use by one customer will generate income for the utility 
(commonly proportional to use), and tariffs may be differentiated so that large 
consumers pay more per unit. On the other hand, the infrastructure required for 
electricity generation in a mini-grid necessitates specific technical knowledge to 
manage, maintain and operate, and capital investment to establish de novo. In an 
irrigation system, rainfall limits the water flow whereas in an electric system the 
utility can, in theory, invest and add capacity to meet growing demand. Still, many 
mini-grids in East Africa (the focus of our empirical study) struggle financially as 
users have low capacity to pay tariffs that are cost-reflective, meters are expensive to 
install and small systems may therefore rely on flat tariffs, which create incentives for 
over-use. In practice, it can be impossible to add capacity to meet growing demand or 
install technical protections to over-use. In such situations, mini-grids – although not 
inherently CPRs – display CPR-like characteristics [52]. These similarities therefore 
imply potential value in exploring the application of a CPR perspective to institutional 
challenges in mini-grid management. In the rest of this article, we, hence, treat mini-
grids as CPRs in order to explore the value of the CPR literature in the context of 
sustainable management of mini-grids. 
 
2.2 Enabling conditions for sustainable management of CPRs 
Recognising similarities across the work of several key authors in the CPR 
management literature [in particular 10, 59, 60], Agrawal [8] reviewed work across 
the CPR literature and developed an overarching framework. This synthesizes the 
conditions under which sustainable management of CPRs is observed into 33 enabling 
conditions, grouped under 4 categories (Figure 1). This overarching framework has 
facilitated subsequent empirical analyses of reasons for long-term sustainability (or 
lack thereof) of institutions in the presence of a wide range of different CPRs. A 
review of 12 common property regimes involving forest, water and pasture in semi-
arid Tanzania found no significant difference in the explanatory power of the enabling 
conditions among different types of CPRs [61] , suggesting application of the 
enabling conditions to other CPRs, like a rural mini-grid, would be equally relevant. 
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3. A refined analytical framework for rural mini-grids 
This section refines Agrawal’s [8] enabling conditions (Figure 1) based on their 
applicability and salience in analysing enabling conditions for the sustainable 
management of rural mini-grids for pro-poor energy access. We consider each of 
Agrawal’s [8] 33 enabling conditions based on their relevance and applicability to 
mini-grids as CPRs. Agrawal’s “external environment” (E1-4) category is not 
considered as it engages with issues beyond the scope of the unit of analysis focussed 
on in this paper, i.e. the applied management of a mini-grid. This does not imply in 
any way that these external environment conditions are irrelevant – on the contrary, as 
Ahlborg and Sjöstedt [62] illustrate, it is in the encounter between a local context in 
all its particularities and a sociotechnical system design that a unique and dynamic 
configuration emerges. How to analytically integrate such a sociotechnical 
perspective with Agrawal’s [8] conditions represents a critical area for specific future 
analysis. The resulting refined framework is shown within the dashed boxes in Figure 
1. 
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Figure 1. Analytical framework: Enabling Conditions for Sustainable Management of CPRs 
Group Characteristics 
 
G1. Small size (RW, B&P) 
G2. Clearly defined boundaries 
(RW, EO) 
G3. Shared norms (B&P) 
G4. Past successful experiences – 
social capital (RW, B&P) 
G5. Appropriate leadership (B&P) 
G6. Interdependence among 
group members (RW, B&P) 
G7. Heterogeneity of 
endowments, homogeneity 
Institutional Arrangements 
 
I1. Rules are simple and easy 
to understand (B&P) 
I2. Locally devised access 
and management rules 
(RW, EO, B&P) 
I3. Ease in enforcement rules 
(RW, EO, B&P) 
I4. Graduated sanctions (RW, 
EO) 
I5. Availability of low-cost 
adjudication (EO) 
Resource System 
Characteristics 
 
R1. Small size (RW) 
R2. Well-defined 
boundaries (RW, EO) 
R3. Low levels of mobility 
(AA) 
R4. Possibilities of storage 
of benefits of 
resources (AA) 
R5. Predictability (AA) 
Overlap 
 
GR1. Overlap between 
user group and 
resource location 
(RW, B&P) 
GR2. High dependence by 
users on resource 
system (RW) 
GR3. Fairness in allocation 
of benefits from CPR 
(B&P) 
GR4. Low levels of user 
Overlap 
 
RI1. Match 
restrictions on 
harvests to 
regeneration of 
resources (RW, 
EO) 
External Environment 
E1. Technology: 
a. Low cost exclusion technology (RW) 
b. Time for adaptation to new technologies related 
to the commons (AA) 
E2. Low levels of articulation with external markets (AA) 
E4. State: 
a. Central governments should not undermine local 
authority (RW, EO) 
b. Supportive external sanctioning institutions (B&P) 
c. Appropriate levels of external aid to compensate 
local users for conservation activities (B&P) 
d. Nested levels of appropriation, provision, 
 
Source: Authors based on Agrawal (2001) 
Figure 1 caption: Figure 1 graphically represents the 33 enabling conditions for collective action collected and developed by Agrawal (2001). Those contained 
within the dotted lines are the conditions retained in the refined analytical framework developed and tested in this paper. 
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3.1. Group Characteristics 
Several conditions within this category are, by definition, characteristics of all rural 
mini-grids and can therefore be set aside for the purposes of analysis. Neither of 
Agrawal’s sources that list small group size (G1) as an enabling condition [59, 60] 
specify a number constituting a “small group”. It is, nonetheless, by definition, a 
characteristic of mini-grids. Clearly defined boundaries (G2), on the other hand, are 
more complex. It could be argued that G2 is defined by the extent of those either 
directly connected to, or directly interacting with the mini-grid (e.g. by paying to 
charge mobile phones or LED lanterns). During the initial establishment and 
subsequent operation of a mini-grid, however, boundaries and who has access to the 
grid can be a deeply political process and one warranting focussed, politically attuned 
analysis [26, 39, 40, 52]. As Wolsink [6, p.831] emphasizes; “The definition of 
system boundaries is particularly important for dealing with the interests within a 
community and with potential conflicts of those interests.” And, all too often, such 
boundaries are assumed to be technical at the expense of considering the politics of 
the organizational and institutional delineations of such boundaries. The inherent 
dangers in making technocratic assumptions about what defines “communities” of 
energy are insightfully analysed by Campbell, Cloke and Brown [63].  
 
The condition of shared norms (G3) does not apply to mini-grid management, as, 
according to Baland and Platteau [60], these are only a requirement if group size is 
large. With regards to mini-grids in contemporary East Africa, it is unlikely that any 
significant past successful experience (G4) will be found with operating mini-grids - 
as emphasised in the introduction, most mini-grids in the developing world struggle to 
operate sustainably. Low levels of poverty (G8) is also not a viable characteristic as 
the explicit interest of this paper (and the policy efforts it seeks to inform) is in 
providing access to electricity for poor people via mini-grids. Heterogeneity of 
endowments and homogeneity of identities and interests (G7) (as demonstrated by 
Kirubi [7]) are, however, a potentially relevant characteristic. This could be applied 
across sub-groups such as anchor loads, businesses and households, or at more 
granular levels, e.g. households within different income groups. Also, the cross-
cutting issues of social differentiation based on gender, class, ethnicity, caste etc. can 
be analysed with G7 as a focal point, but are not limited to this condition (they are 
contextual). A related issue, which has not been studied before in the context of mini-
 12 
grids, is the interdependence among group members (G6), which must be understood 
in the specific context of each individual mini-grid. Entrepreneurs utilising the 
resource for economically productive uses upon which other users depend might, for 
example, act as facilitators of collective action. This also creates a risk of elite control 
or capture, which can be problematic, especially if appropriate leadership (G5) is 
lacking. Critical reflection on the existing treatment of “identities and interests” in the 
literature that underpins Agrawal’s [8] original framework of enabling conditions, 
however, reveals the limited way in which identities and interests have been treated to 
date. Several sources (see, e.g. [60]) consider this only in relation to socio-economic 
differentiation - less inter-household income inequality having been empirically 
observed in several studies to result in more equitable access to CPRs. Kirubi’s 
(2009) later work also considers this in terms of the alignment of interests between 
elite actors and other mini-grid users (greater alignment resulting in greater likelihood 
of sustainable management). None of this, however, adequately captures the broader 
aspects of social inequality that extend well beyond income inequality and that are 
likely to be material to mediating both the sustainability of mini-grid management and 
the equity of access to electricity or energy services more broadly that result from 
access. Such aspects are contextual and include, amongst others, issues of gender and 
ethnicity. The treatment and application of G7 therefore needs to extend to these 
broader aspects of social inequality (E1-4 are not satisfactory in this respect), which 
will often cut across many of the other group characteristics (not least the question of 
leadership) in important, often complex and hidden ways (see, in particular Winther et 
al. [40] for more in-depth conceptual thinking on women’s empowerment). 
 
3.2. Resource System Characteristics 
In a mini-grid, resource system characteristics are relatively straightforward to define. 
Small system size (R1) is a given, for reasons analogous to those outlined above 
regarding group characteristics. Well-defined boundaries, on the other hand, are again 
more complex. On the one hand, it could be assumed that these are analogous to the 
direct, physical area the grid covers. Similar to G2 above, however, there is not any 
natural reason why the institutional governance arrangement of a mini-grid should 
correspond spatially to the network of the grid. In many cases, for example, actors 
involved in the electricity generation side of the grid are part of the governance 
regime, as are the local elite (even when they are not connected to the grid in their 
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own homes), donors, international NGOs, higher levels of government and civil 
groups (churches, women’s groups, craftsmen, traders), etc. Many kinds of 
association tend to be given influence, even if these are very different from the group 
of “users” observed to be actively connected to and using the grid. In this sense, the 
boundaries of the resource could be argued to be as much an artifact of political 
processes that include and exclude certain actors, involve multiple considerations and 
can be contested and changed over time, as they could be considered to be a 
technically defined category. The energy resource base itself may also yield unique 
institutional challenges arising with conflicts over land, water and food/bioenergy. 
E.g. Ahlborg’s [39, 62] analyses in Tanzania highlights the significance of decisions 
to initially electrify downstream but not upstream of a hydropower based mini-grid.  
 
Low levels of mobility (R3) of the resource are present by definition, as electricity 
cannot leave the resource system (i.e. the mini-grid). Possibilities of storage of 
resource benefits (R4) depends on the particular mini-grid design and whether 
batteries are present. The final characteristic concerned with predictability (R5) is 
again a function of the energy source used (solar/ hydro/gen-set/other). Since 
conditions R4 and R5 relate to specific technological considerations, neither of them 
is included in the refined framework, as the aim here is to focus explicitly on 
institutional aspects of mini-grid management, as opposed to their technical design. 
 
3.3. Group and Resource System Overlap 
As with conditions G2 and R2 above, if one were to consider only the users connected 
to the mini-grid, the location of the resource system and user group might be 
considered to be identical, rendering consideration of the overlap between the two 
(GR1) moot. As alluded to in relation to R2, however, once the generation system is 
considered, as well as the many people that might pay for services from the grid 
without being connected themselves (e.g. for charging solar lanterns), then the degree 
of overlap becomes a more complex consideration, opening up myriad additional 
governance considerations. 
 
Low levels of user demand (GR4) are to be expected initially, as communities will 
take time to begin to use electricity and build up demand. This build-up, however, 
will lead to a gradual change in levels of demand (GR5). The importance of this 
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change and how it interacts with the initially low levels of demand can be a 
significant consideration, as rising demand must be met by expensive system 
upgrades. High dependency by users on the resource system (GR2) in this context 
relates to how different uses can increase dependency on the system and also 
potentially help generate income streams necessary to maintain the system in the long 
run. This, however, requires fairness in allocation of benefits (GR3) highlighting the 
potential importance of conflict between, particularly, household uses (e.g. lighting 
and mobile phone charging) and productive uses (e.g. refrigeration or agricultural 
processing). As a result, conditions GR2-5 warrant closer analysis in this context. 
 
3.4. Institutional Arrangements 
Institutional arrangements are primary to the kinds of management considerations this 
paper seeks to engage with; they can potentially play a crucial role in the 
sustainability of mini-grids, offering opportunities to create enabling conditions from 
the outset (or allow for adaptive governance of local grids [6]). Rules (I1) need to be 
simple and easy to understand, requiring members of the community to be able to 
understand them and their rationale. This is similar to the argument for requiring 
locally devised access and management rules (I2) - which in the mini-grid context 
concerns the extent and nature of community participation in the formulation of rules, 
especially when there is no metering. The extent to which rules are easy to enforce 
(I3) is also relevant and relates to the degree of mutual oversight within the 
community. Graduated sanctions (I4) beyond simple disconnection have to date not 
been described in the literature on mini-grids, yet more analysis on the potential role 
that these could play could yield useful insights. Similarly, as sanctioning processes 
become more and more refined, the availability of low cost adjudication (I5) takes on 
greater importance. Finally, and crucially, monitors and other officials must be 
accountable to electricity consumers (I6) in order to minimize, for example, the risk 
for elite capture and squandering of revenues. All of the institutional arrangements are 
therefore included in the refined framework. 
 
3.5. Resource System and Institutional Overlap 
Matching use restrictions to regeneration of resource (RI1), i.e. matching supply and 
demand within the mini-grid, is one of the central challenges of managing any 
electricity network and hence is included in the refined framework. 
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4. Methodology 
Step 1: Theoretical refinement 
As reflected in Section 3 above, each of Agawal’s [8] 33 enabling conditions were 
considered in the context of rural mini-grids in developing countries and a refined 
framework produced. 
 
Step 2: Case study selection and data collection 
Kenya was selected as a relevant empirical context because: 1) national access levels 
are well below the continental average, less than 25% of Kenyans having access to 
electricity, rendering this a particularly urgent development priority that fits with the 
pro-poor focus of this paper; 2) there is a relatively rich (compared to other countries 
in sub-Saharan Africa) history of mini-grid development in Kenya and; 3) Kenya has, 
over the last two years, attracted a relatively large number of private sector actors to 
the market for rural mini-grids with around twenty mini-grids established by three key 
private sector entrants, furthering the diversity of perspectives to learn from. 
 
Empirical data was collected from two field visits to rural mini-grids and 27 semi-
structured interviews. The mini-grids were selected as both have community-based 
management arrangements, but differ in key characteristics (see Table 2), thus 
improving coverage of analysis. Each field visit lasted one day. Detailed tours were 
conducted. These were recorded by video and detailed notes taken. In Kitonyoni the 
guides were two members of the management committee. The village chief was also 
interviewed. In Olosho-Oibor the guide was the local technician and grid manager. 
Informal discussions were also conducted with two teachers, a shop operator 
(operating a solar lantern and mobile phone charging booth) and the manager of the 
Girl’s Rescue Centre (that is connected to the mini-grid). Data was triangulated 
wherever possible with documentary evidence. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of field visit mini-grids 
 Kitonyoni Olosho-Oibor 
Location Makueni County, Eastern 
Province 
Ngong, Kajiado County, 
Rift Valley Province 
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Operational since 2012 2009 
Owner Cooperative, donor-funded Community-based 
organisation, donor-funded 
Operator Cooperative and 
University of Southampton 
E4D 
Community-based 
organisation 
Generation technology Solar PV with diesel 
backup generator 
Solar PV, single wind 
turbine, diesel backup 
generator 
Generation Capacity 14 kWp PV and 37 kW 
diesel (diesel never run at 
time of visit) 
10 kWp wind and solar, 10 
kW diesel backup 
Metering technology Post-paid meters and 
prepaid meters using 
scratch cards 
Flat fee, unmetered 
Number of connections 20 business connections 
with 10 of these businesses 
also being attached to 
households and thus 
providing household 
connections 
12-15, including private 
businesses (barber shop, 
printing shop, electronics 
shop), public institutions 
(school, dispensary, girl’s 
rescue centre), a charging 
kiosk and 5-7 households 
nearby 
Types of customers Public institutions (e.g. 
clinic and school) and 
small businesses 
Public institutions (e.g. 
clinic and school), 
households and small 
businesses 
 
27 semi-structured interviews were subsequently conducted with 24 mini-grid experts 
in Kenya during January-February 2015. Interviewee sample covered a cross-section 
of backgrounds, institutions and sectors. Initial sample selection was based on 
identification of experts with experiences with mini-grid deployment and operation 
within Kenya. A snowballing approach was then applied to provide a diversity of 
backgrounds and perspectives. Sample coverage included: private sector (including 
energy consultancies, mini-grid technology providers, solar PV technology providers, 
energy finance specialists and off-grid electricity developers); NGOs (including those 
with an energy access focus and those with a rural development focus); public sector 
employees; donors; intergovernmental organisations; and academia. Findings were 
triangulated via cross-comparison across interviews and grey literature, including 
project reports and proposals. 
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Interviews were conducted using a semi-structured approach in the form of ‘in depth 
interviews’ [64], where conversation was permitted to flow freely, yet was closely 
guided by a catalogue of questions. Questions were designed to be open and non-
leading, whilst directing conversation towards operational challenges faced in relation 
to rural mini-grids (see supplementary online material for full catalogue of questions). 
 
Step 3: Data analysis and testing of refined framework 
Data were then analysed via the refined framework of enabling conditions to test the 
framework’s utility. A methodological decision was made to exclude conditions G2, 
R2 and GR1 from the current analysis. As alluded to above, these conditions raise 
myriad complex political considerations which warrant significant, focussed analysis 
(in a similar vein to those previously conducted by a number of key authors [26, 35, 
39, 62]) – analysis which was beyond the resources available for the current study. 
Similarly, in this initial empirical testing of the framework, we did not have the 
resources available to explore dimensions of social inequality (including gender and 
ethnicity/caste) beyond the original focus of the literature described above on socio-
economic equality and alignment of interests between elites and the wider community 
of resource users. It should be emphasised, however, that this was a pragmatic 
decision based on resource availability and should in no way be taken to belittle the 
importance of these three enabling conditions, or these wider contextual dimensions 
of social inequality for future research. 
 
 
5. Applying the refined framework 
Here we apply the refined framework (Figure 1) to our empirical data to test its 
utility. We begin by considering resource system characteristics then discuss each of 
the enabling conditions included in our analysis as they emerge, often through clear 
links to one another. 
 
A vital challenge for many mini-grids, due to high cost and relative inefficiency of 
storing large amounts of electricity, is to match use of the resource to available re-
generation capacity (condition RI1). Whilst balance of supply and demand is common 
to all electric grids, seasonal fluctuations of supply and demand are particularly 
challenging in a rural mini-grid. The enabling conditions in the refined framework 
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direct our analytic focus to both the nature of this particular management challenge 
and potential solutions. On the demand side, the data suggested that seasonal 
variations are likely to be greatest in areas in which agriculture dominates the village 
economy. Here, disposable income is largely dependent on harvest season when 
households can spend more on electricity. The data also emphasised that agro-
processing can be energy intensive, e.g. use of mills and grinders, leading to major 
peaks in the annual demand schedule. Furthermore, demand varies throughout the 
day, household demand peaking after sunset as demand for lighting increases. This 
peak is exacerbated by traditional practices in agricultural areas: 
 
“... there are challenges because traditionally people tend to do processing in 
the afternoon and in the evening so the time of day affects balancing your 
power load […]” (Interviewee 1) 
 
In addition to RI1, this relates to GR4 and GR5 (initial low levels and gradual change 
in demand) as demand levels change with seasonality in a step-change form rather 
than a gradual increase/decrease.  
 
Seasonality also creates problems on the supply side. Even in the equatorial climate of 
Kenya, solar PV and wind are subject to seasonal variations in sunshine and wind 
speed, albeit less so than small hydro power, which is significantly affected by the 
rainy and dry seasons. There are several relatively crude ways of dealing with this 
problem. In Olosho-Oibor, the mini-grid operator simply switches off entire branches 
of the mini-grid during times of low supply, i.e. overcast days with very little wind. 
Conversly, in Kitonyoni a very large amount of excess capacity has been built into the 
system from the beginning, while the number of connections has been fairly limited. 
Estimates gathered during the field visit suggested that, at that time, consumption at 
no point exceeded 10-15% of the available generation capacity. Neither of these 
solutions is optimal; in one case consumers are switched off when they might need 
electricity the most; in the other case, expensive excess capacity is present without 
generating any revenue for the mini-grid or benefits to potential consumers. 
 
Looking to the other conditions in the refined framework, however, a number of 
alternative solutions are implied for balancing supply and demand. The first step in 
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this direction is simple and locally devised rules (I1 and I2) that allocate the 
electricity to each user. 
 
“Each and every household will already know exactly what they will use the 
power for… You will be given an amount of power based on your lot.” 
(Interviewee 2) 
 
This also relates to condition GR3 (fairness in allocation). Through, for example, 
creation of type-of-use rules (e.g. prohibiting use of energy intensive appliances, e.g. 
irons or kettles, or installing technologies like switches to control usage), the limited 
electricity supply available in a small mini-grid can benefit a larger number of people 
than it could without those rules. This was, for example, described by Interviewee 1 in 
relation to an older community-based micro hydro mini-grid (Kathamba in the Central 
province of Kenya). Such rules can also ensure each community member gets access 
to a similar amount of electricity, e.g. by determining that each household must at 
least be able to light two light bulbs. The data suggested that time-of-day rules can 
also be fairly simple; businesses are encouraged to operate during day time, when 
household electricity demand is low, and discouraged to operate after sunset, when 
electricity is required for household lighting and entertainment.  
 
In a context like Olosho-Oibor, rules can obviate the need even for load limiters, as 
long as the entire community is aware of and abide by them. There are, however, 
limits to the usefulness of locally devised rules, e.g. in setting tariffs. Besides inherent 
conflicts of interest (communities may want lowest possible prices regardless of the 
effect on the financial sustainability of the mini-grid), our data suggest that there are 
additional potential pitfalls when determining tariffs with direct involvement of the 
community. In Kitonyoni, tariffs were set based on community surveys. According to 
the village chief, community members were asked to state what they would be able to 
pay for electricity, based on current expenditure on other sources of energy. 
Community members did not want to appear poor so they overstated their ability to 
pay, resulting in initial tariff levels considerably higher than anything the community 
had spent on energy before. This relates back to condition G7 and the role of the 
heterogeneity of endowments, in this case interpreted as the variation in ability and 
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willingness to pay within the community. In order to ensure the viability of the 
system, tariffs had to be lowered quickly to accurately reflect the ability to pay. 
 
The other issue with locally-determined tariffs is the risk of elite capture and conflict 
[see 52], highlighting the importance of accountability of officials (I6), especially in 
closely-knit communities: 
 
“There are mini-grids around that have followed an entirely community-based 
approach particularly for tariff collection and tariff setting. But they run into 
a number of issues because if it is your sister or friend you charge them 10ct 
per kWh whereas the agreed level was 45ct and then because you have that 
relationship it is more difficult to have debt.” (Interviewee 4) 
 
This experience suggests direct peer-to-peer involvement in tariff payment collection 
could lead to operational difficulties and potential conflicts. Such dynamics seemed 
problematic within the community at Olosho-Oibor. When asked whether failure to 
pay tariffs was a problem, the local mini-grid manager and technician agreed that this 
sometimes happened. Further conversation, however, suggested failure to pay had 
never resulted in disconnection, as the village committee has to agree to this step and 
to date had never done so. 
 
This highlights the importance of appropriate leadership (G5), ease of enforcement of 
rules (I3) and availability of low-cost adjudication (I5). The apparent absence of these 
and other conditions might explain why Olosho-Oibor has repeatedly had to raise 
donor funding to remain operational. Technological developments, such as the 
introduction of prepaid meters using mobile payment systems [see 65] – considered 
“a game changer” by Interviewee 5 – facilitate enforcement of rules, as they remove 
the need for cash collection and adjudication, and reduce risk of elite capture 
(although they cannot remove it entirely as elite capture can still happen in a myriad 
of ways). A similar concern led Kitonyoni to adopt prepaid meters. There is, however, 
still a role for community involvement in enforcement of rules, which can greatly 
affect ease of enforcement (I3). In particular, enforcement of type-of-use rules 
mentioned above can be carried out very effectively in a peer-to-peer setting: 
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“There is the idea of two bulbs per household at night but again in the village 
when you buy a fridge your neighbour will know that you have a fridge. Or 
when you buy a TV your neighbour will know.” (Interviewee 6) 
 
“... the best way of looking at managing the loads at any one time is by 
actually controlling the appliances used by members. They’ve got a limited 
number of people and they know what they are using - it is basically a very 
close-knit community. So when one line disconnects they actually find out who 
was the cause for that and that means there is a new appliance that has come 
into effect or something like that.” (Interviewee 1) 
 
An additional benefit of this level of community involvement is that it discourages 
theft by wiring around the meter. Several interviewees mentioned that despite 
expectations of theft becoming a problem it did not transpire in practice to the degree 
they feared it might. This suggests that if enough people benefit locally (or are 
dependent on the resource - GR2) and the system is locally owned and managed, a 
mutual understanding develops that tampering with the system could affect everyone 
– an attitude typical of successful collective action. In comparison to large-scale grid 
infrastructure – where theft is a serious problem – mini-grids therefore benefit from 
the way social ownership and control deter free-riding behaviours.  
 
Fairness in allocation (GR2) is also particularly relevant in a mini-grid serving a 
variety of customers. If an anchor tenant (a high demand commercial user) is present 
it is often given priority in allocation of electricity, with other businesses being next in 
line and households being the lowest priority during the day. This allocation is often 
then revised after sunset to give household lighting higher priority. 
 
“... we find that in most instances, even in other places, a community centre or 
maybe if you are powering a hospital or people are charging their phones, the 
priority will be given to that common centre compared to the households... So 
they look at what is the priority for now. It’s just an arrangement. They are 
looking at who needs power at what particular time and then can work with 
the system.” (Interviewee 7) 
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It is important, however, that this allocation is perceived as fair by everyone since 
homogeneity of interests (G7) in this process is far from guaranteed. In Olosho-Oibor, 
public institutions (the school, dispensary, church and a rescue centre for girls being 
protected from female genital mutilation), are given clear priority in allocation of 
electricity, an arrangement that at least those community members spoken to during 
the field visit (the local technician, two teachers, a worker at the dispensary and the 
head of the rescue centre) seemed to agree with. In another example, described by 
Interviewee 8 (Mpeketoni in Northern Kenya), the mini-grid managers decided to 
favour businesses in electricity allocation due to their superior ability to generate 
income to pay for electricity consumption, especially given tariffs are usually 
differentiated between businesses and households (a point raised again later in this 
analysis). Households felt they were being treated unfairly, even though they were 
customers like everyone else, and they effectively forced the management to revise 
their allocation schedules. This highlights the potential importance of finding the right 
balance between serving those customers who generate most revenue (businesses) and 
those who might be able to generate the most opposition within the community (in 
this case households). It could also be argued to be a key consideration in relation to 
any normative commitment to prioritise electricity access for poor women and men. 
 
In Kitonyoni, the challenge of addressing very different user needs has been pre-
empted by not connecting any households and instead offering charging services for 
lanterns and cell phones through a commercial outlet. While this approach, at least in 
the literal sense, does not pursue universal electrification, the business benefits of 
access to electricity are clearly visible. For example, a self-taught young man repairs 
electronics using a soldering iron, a skilled job he could not have done without, and 
the need for which is bolstered by, access to electricity. Revenue raised from such 
productive uses of electricity has important implications for financial sustainability of 
the mini-grid and, more generally speaking, broader economic development and 
poverty reduction as a result of electrification. 
 
Considering the role that interdependence of group members and their dependence on 
the resource (G6 and GR2) play in sustainable operation of a mini-grid helps to 
further illustrate difficulties in serving differing customer needs within the same 
closed resource system. In particular, over-reliance on one anchor load can be 
 23 
problematic in light of the goal of universal electrification, highlighting the 
interdependence of resource users (G6): 
 
“If you put in an anchor [load] of course the anchor will consume 60% of the 
generation. Then you have 40% which the business people have to fight over 
together with the consumers on the ground to get it. So what do you really 
want to do?” (Interviewee 2) 
 
This interdependence becomes even more critical if there is one particularly important 
anchor customer, i.e. if condition G7 is not met and interests are especially 
heterogeneous. Interviewee 8, again in relation to the Mpeketoni mini-grid, described 
how a whole community was shut off whenever a critical medical procedure occurred 
at the dispensary, e.g. surgery, or a woman delivering, in order to ensure 100% 
reliable electricity supply during that critical time. This level of interdependence is 
clearly problematic, especially if other users depend on the electricity for 
economically productive purposes, something that assists financial sustainability of 
the mini-grid.  
 
Reducing such dependence on anchor loads and other critical loads potentially allows 
more reliable electricity supply to businesses and households (if additional generation 
capacity is not possible). This is particularly relevant to the long-term financial 
sustainability of the mini-grid as businesses often form the backbone of the mini-grid 
and are central to the realisation of economic opportunities resulting from electricity 
access: 
 
“For us, businesses is where it’s at. They use more power, they generate good 
income, the income they can generate by having power is significantly higher 
than without... You are essentially giving people the ability to pay your bills.” 
(Interviewee 5) 
 
Demand from businesses, however, does not appear automatically as soon as 
electricity becomes available. Creating supplementary businesses (intersecting again 
with G6 and G7) such as charging stations, agro-processing enterprises, water pumps 
or even TV broadcasts of major sporting events, can help generate revenue from 
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productive uses, foster economic development in the community, or create demand 
during daylight hours, allowing sale of electricity to households at night at more 
affordable rates (Interviewees 5 and 10).  
 
When building an increasingly powerful mini-grid with productive uses in mind, 
however, it should be noted that demand can grow quite rapidly rather than gradually 
over time (condition GR5) despite starting out at very low levels (GR4). If demand 
growth is not anticipated it can cause grid reliability problems and customer 
dissatisfaction: 
 
“In the first one year the growth is very high and then it goes to about 5%... 
When you have a private investor they don’t want to over-invest... When that 
growth comes they [the private investor] might not be able to meet the 
demand... When the demand goes up and you are not matching it, the quality 
of supply goes down so the customers complain a lot.” (Interviewee 8) 
 
Kitonyoni and Olosho-Oibor exhibit this problem in different ways. In Kitonyoni, 
large excess capacity has been built in, which sits idle until demand catches up. There 
is an inherent risk that demand might not grow for as long or as quickly as expected. 
This approach is only possible in a donor-driven model less focused on financial 
sustainability than private sector models. In Olosho-Oibor, demand has not been able 
to grow as the system was undersized from the beginning (10 kWp wind and solar, 10 
kW diesel backup compared to 14 kWp PV and 37 kW diesel in Kitonyoni) and 
investment in upgrades was not viable due to low tariffs. This has potentially stifled 
economic activity in the community. 
 
Finally, we turn to appropriate leadership and ways in which accountability can be 
ensured (G5 and I6). Several interviewees (1, 2, 7 and 9) stressed the importance of 
appropriate leadership, which they understood as dedicated and technically educated 
management with a local presence. First and foremost, a need was articulated for a 
local, dedicated manager employed by the organization operating the mini-grid and 
available to the local community for customer service and simple repairs: 
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“He [the local leader] is the first point of contact to the management. Most of 
the time when you have an issue, a wire came loose or very basic things so a 
technical person doesn’t need to go there... You need a leader in the 
community that understands a little bit of the system and makes sense of it.” 
(Interviewee 9) 
 
Importantly, since this manager is an employee of the organization owning and 
operating the mini-grid s/he can be let go if there are problems with the management 
of the system, in theory ensuring accountability (although the lack of alternative 
manager often makes this impractical). 
 
Both Olosho-Oibor and Kitonyoni have such dedicated management. In addition, 
however, interviewees suggested local management should be supported by an 
organization with the technical capacity to conduct more complex system 
maintenance, repairs and upgrades. Ideally such an organization could facilitate low-
cost adjudication and graduated sanctions (I4 and I5). While Kitonyoni has a 
dedicated cooperative and can, for now, rely on the University of Southampton and its 
partners for technical support, Olosho-Oibor has been struggling with this, resulting in 
poor state of repair of the system, including a broken off wind vane on the wind 
turbine and poorly performing batteries, as well as the aforementioned problems with 
rule enforcement. 
 
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to evaluate whether CPR theory can assist in analysing and 
designing sustainable institutions for managing electricity provision in rural mini-
grids, in contexts where many people are poor and currently lack access to electricity 
grid services. Theoretically, the paper has contributed to advancing the state of the art 
in the energy and development literature by systematically and critically examining 
the ways in which mini-grids in poor rural contexts display CPR characteristics. 
Taking the context, as well as system characteristics into consideration, we developed 
a refined analytical framework of enabling conditions for sustainable management of 
mini-grids (Figure 1), and applied this empirically to the development of mini-grids in 
rural Kenya.  
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The result is a new analytic approach to assessing the characteristics of sustainable 
management approaches to rural mini-grids for pro-poor electricity access. In our 
view, the empirical analysis demonstrates how the refined framework usefully focuses 
analytic attention on multiple problems faced by users of rural mini-grids, as well as 
by expert practitioners whose role it is to design, implement and finance rural mini-
grids in Kenya. In relation to previous studies of rural electrification and mini-grids in 
poor rural communities, our analysis supports previous findings on institutional 
challenges, such as being able to respond to changing supply and demand (including 
daily and seasonal changes, as well as longer-term, more gradual changes); and the 
role of local leadership and clear institutional frameworks and use rules [7, 66]. These 
previous findings are, however, scattered across various studies and their 
recommendations about institutional aspects typically lack grounding in institutional 
theory.  
 
As emphasised in the introduction, we do not claim, nor did we aim to achieve, a 
comprehensive analysis of all of the complex management issues pertaining to the 
sustainable management of mini-grids. The analysis and theory development in this 
paper, nevertheless, represents a focussed and theoretically grounded attempt at 
arriving at a better understanding of institutional aspects and possible solutions, which 
can provide a useful focus for future research in this field. It is important to note here, 
however, that the methodological decision to exclude conditions G2, R2, GR1 and 
broader aspects of social inequality (including, but not limited to, gender and 
ethnicity/caste) from the analysis above was purely pragmatic based on available 
resources and represents a gap in this paper’s analysis that warrants focussed future 
attention. We would point readers in particular to the emerging literature that attends 
to gender in the context of energy access [e.g. 39, 40, 67, 68, 69], including the 
ENERGIA2 programme. Relatedly, this paper also does not review in depth the wider 
literature on participatory governance and energy access (mentioned in Section 2); a 
systematic review of this literature and the ways in which it overlaps and can speak to 
the refined, CPR inspired framework developed here represents an additional key area 
for future research effort. 
                                                 
2 http://www.energia.org 
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Applying the refined analytical framework developed here to other examples of mini-
grid management, or the design of institutions for managing future mini-grids, would 
also serve to generate the empirical basis for comparative analysis and further 
refinement of the research and policy/practice applications of the framework. In line 
with previous studies [36, 62], the analysis above points to the importance of 
developing ‘use rules’ that are widely understood and implementable and that, 
through shared community ownership, can contribute to what is widely perceived a 
fair allocation of benefits and responsibilities, not just between homogenous groups of 
users such as households, but also across diverse groups of interdependent users that 
are present in many mini-grids (including private sector anchor tenants, or community 
organisations such as schools or hospitals). A related additional key area for future 
research (which the authors are currently writing up initial analysis on), building 
directly on this paper’s application of CPR management theory, is a closer analysis of 
the issue of property rights in relation to mini-grid management (as also highlighted 
by Wolsink [6]). This plays a central role in much of the CPR literature and raises 
interesting questions for the management of mini-grids insofar as the application of 
different technologies (e.g. prepaid meters and mobile payment systems) can 
influence the nature of the property rights that characterize different mini-grids [33, 
70]. It also raises questions regarding the interrelationship between technological, 
financial, socio-cultural, political and other institutional considerations. Questions 
include how these technologies affect the dynamics of resource management and 
collective action potential and whether key issues highlighted in the analysis above, 
such as seasonality and fair allocation, persist regardless of the effective property 
rights regime implied by different technological applications. This also speaks to 
broader debates in the CPR literature that engage with tensions between moves 
towards privatizing CPRs vs. collective action based solutions and whether or not 
poor and marginalised women and men gain or lose as a result [71]. 
 
The analysis in this paper contributes both theoretically and empirically to a nascent 
socio-cultural turn [12] in the literature on sustainable energy access, further 
strengthening the case for moving beyond the literature’s previous two-dimensional 
focus on technology/finance and engineering/economics based analysis. This in no 
way downplays the critical importance of the latter. Rather, it positions technology 
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and finance as part of a broader perspective where socio-cultural and political 
considerations are of equal and sometimes greater concern in understanding and 
effecting sustainable energy access [65].  
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